Miss Arendt is more reticent than, perhaps, she should be, about what actually went on in this public realm of the Greeks. —W. H. Auden.

Non-knowledge should not be simply regarded as the opposite of knowledge, but as complementary to it: each derives its character and meaning from the other and from their interaction. Knowledge does not colonize the space of ignorance in the progressive march of science; rather, knowledge and ignorance are mutually shaped in social and political domains of partial, shifting, and temporal relationships. This volume’s ethnographic analyses provide a theoretical frame through which to consider the production and reproduction of ignorance, non-knowledge, and (...) secrecy, as well as the wider implications these ideas have for anthropology and related disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. (shrink)

This paper attempts to cross the disciplinary boundaries of strategic management and social issues management to demonstrate the relationship between managerial characteristics and corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing on studies in strategic leadership research we develop and test hypotheses about linkages between top management attributes and different levels of CSP. Our results add credence to the argument that organizations are a reflection of their top managers, and encourage further systematic research of the influence of key executives in developing and implementing (...) socially responsible policies and programs. (shrink)

Recent findings in several organ systems show that cytoneme‐mediated signaling transports signaling proteins along cellular extensions and targets cell‐to‐cell exchanges to synaptic contacts. This mechanism of paracrine signaling may be a general one that is used by many (or all) cell types in many (or all) organs. We briefly review these findings in this perspective. We also describe the properties of several signaling systems that have previously been interpreted to support a passive diffusion mechanism of signaling protein dispersion, but can (...) now be understood in the context of the cytoneme mechanism.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

This volume offers the first English language collection of academic essays on the post-Holocaust thought of Jean Améry, a Jewish-Austrian-Belgian essayist, journalist and literary author. Comprehensive in scope and multi-disciplinary in orientation, contributors explore central aspects of Améry's philosophical and ethical position, including dignity, responsibility, resentment, and forgiveness.

In the second edition of this groundbreaking text in non-Western philosophy, sixteen experts introduce some of the great philosophical traditions in the world. The essays unveil exciting, sophisticated philosophical traditions that are too often neglected in the western world. The contributors include the leading scholars in their fields, but they write for students coming to these concepts for the first time. Building on revisions and updates to the original, this new edition also considers three philosophical traditions for the first time—Jewish, (...) Buddhist, and South Pacific philosophy. (shrink)

Although they hold different political positions, Oakeshott and Dunn actually share in common a sceptical reading of the human condition and the nature of politics. There are, however, two sceptical traditions within the British context that they seem, respectively, to have followed: the Humean autonomy of practice and the Lockean quest for guidance. It is hoped that by tracing their sources back to Hume and Locke, Oakeshott's and Dunn's conflicting views on the theory of practical reason, namely the detachment view (...) versus the engagement view, can be well explicated, and that the differentia between the `right' and the `left' can be philosophically reconsidered. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Thomas Kuhn's account of thought experiments. It begins with what Kuhn takes to be the smart talk about thought experiments. It then details Kuhn's amendments to this view and raises objections, most of which are directed against the notion of local incoherence. Finally, Kuhn's error is reconstructed in order to salvage the considerable insight that it contains.

the lack of unity among Christians represents the grave obstacle for the proclamation of the gospel, we should take every suitable opportunity to increase the unity of all Christians. The present essay is meant as a contribution toward this goal.” . The increased unity he has in mind is a reconciliation of the traditional scholastic interpretation of Christian doctrine , and the Calvinist tradition . More specifically, he seeks a unity between them concerning the relation of faith and reason, that (...) is, the role of reason in belief in God. To this end he compares what he understands of the CT, as represented by Calvin and Dooyeweerd, with the TSC as represented by St Thomas and the encyclical, Fides et Ratio by Pope John Paul II. In all that follows I will be agreeing with Echeverria that this is, indeed, an important concern and a laudable goal, and I hope that what I offer here in reply to his essay will be taken in that same charitable spirit. So even though I find that Echeverria’s account of the differences between the TSC and the CT is seriously mistaken, I do agree that it would go a long way toward greater cooperation between our two traditions if we could at least agree on what our differences are and work toward resolving them. For that reason I will be more concerned here with clarifying those differences than with arguing for the CT. That does not mean that I will not at times offer brief accounts of why I think the CT is right to differ from the TSC on certain points; it only means that I do not regard the case I will make for these points as anywhere near complete. This brevity is made necessary because I find the misunderstandings of Calvin, and especially of Dooyeweerd, to be so many and so knotted in “Fides et Ratio” as to form a tangled skein that would require more than just one article to unravel. I have also decided that there are so many strands to this skein that for the sake of clarity I will restrict myself to only a few of them. My assumption is that it would be better to make real progress with getting a few key differences in focus, than to end up producing a tangle of my own in an attempt to cover every point raised in Echeverria’s long article. My hope is that the treatment of the points I do cover will be sufficient to indicate how a more thorough untangling would proceed. (shrink)

Can merely thinking about an imaginary situation provide evidence for how the world actually is--or how it ought to be? In this lively book, Roy A. Sorensen addresses this question with an analysis of a wide variety of thought experiments ranging from aesthetics to zoology. Presenting the first general theory of thought experiment, he sets it within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science, with special emphasis on Ernst Mach and Thomas (...) Kuhn. Sorensen explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their virtues and vices are. In his view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Sorensen assesses the hazards of thought experiments and grants that there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, but attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. He maintains that they should be used--as they generally are--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques, creating a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability. (shrink)

In his book “Seeing Dark Things” (2008), Roy Sorensen provides many wonderfully ingenious arguments for many surprising, counter-intuitive claims. One such claim in particular is that when we a silhouetted object – i.e. an opaque object lit entirely from behind – we literally see its back-side – i.e. we see the full expanse of the surface facing away from us that is blocking the incoming light. Sorensen himself admits that this seems a tough pill to swallow, later characterising it as (...) “the most controversial thesis of the book” (2011, p199). -/- I will argue against Sorensen’s controversial thesis and in favour of what seems to me to be a much more natural and commonsensical alternative: when we see a silhouetted object, what we see is its edge and only its edge – so we do not see its entire back-side. (shrink)

“Politeness” appears to be connected to a quite disparate set of related concepts, including but not limited to, “manners,” “etiquette,” “agreeableness,” “respect” and even “piety.” While in the East politeness considered as an important social virtue is present (and even central) in the theoretical and practical expressions of the Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist traditions, (indeed politeness has been viewed in these traditions as central to proper education) it has not featured prominently in philosophical discussion in the West. American presidents (...) class='Hi'>Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington all devoted discussion to politeness within the broader ambit of manners and etiquette, as too did Erasmus, Edmund Burke and Ralph Waldo Emerson but on the whole sustained philosophical engagement with the topic has been lacking in the West. The richest source for philosophical investigation is perhaps afforded by the centrality of the concept of respect in Immanuel Kant.However in this paper we will instead draw on the writings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to defend the centrality of “politeness” as an important and valuable moral virtue. Starting with an analysis of the broader Aristotelian arguments on the virtues associated with “agreeableness,” namely, friendliness, truthfulness and wit I will argue that “politeness” should be thought of as an important moral virtue attached to social intercourse (and by extension the vice of impoliteness). I then move to identify an even broader and more important account of politeness, drawing on the work of Aquinas, as intimately connected to the notion of pietas (piety) as a fundamental part of the virtue of justice. (shrink)